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Abstract: 
  The study presents stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming (SOC/DP) to 
derive the optimal debt level and consumption in farm models concerning two sources of 
uncertainty: the return on assets and interest rate.  The SOC/DP analytic framework is 
used to analyze the impacts of risk-reducing farm policies on farm’s financial and risk 
adjustments.  The results show the violations of the risk-balancing concept, which 
theorizes that risk-reducing farm policies may lead to increases in financial leverage, total 
risk, and the expected returns.  Also, this study examines the extent to which the 
estimates of the optimal debt level are biased when interest rate risk is ignored.  
 
Keywords: Stochastic  Optimal  Control/Dynamic Programming, Financial Leverage, 
Uncertainty, Risk Balancing.  1 
The Paradox of Risk Balancing:  Do Risk Reducing Policies 
 Lead to More Risk for Farmers? 
    Capital structure, or how the firm chooses to finance its operations, is a critical 
decision facing farm businesses.  The use of financial leverage influences both the 
expected level of the return on equity and the risk associated with this return.  Increasing 
the firm’s borrowing increases the capital available for production, allowing expansion of 
the farm business.  When the cost of debt is less than the returns it generates, adding 
leverage results in greater expected return on equity.  However, before the owners of the 
equity capital can take their return, a share of the operating profit must be allocated to 
meeting the interest payment on the debt capital.  Highly leveraged firms must be 
concerned about meeting their financial obligations and recognize uncertainty about 
future costs and availability of credit.  As a result, the amount of financial leverage that a 
firm can utilize is dependent upon the riskiness or variability of the cash flows generated 
by the business.  Therefore, producers’ decisions of financial leverage must consider the 
business risks that confront their operation.   
  The  risk-balancing  hypothesis by Gabriel and Baker (1980) states that when an 
exogenous shock affects the level of farm’s business risk, producers might make the 
offsetting financial adjustments leading to increased (or decreased) financial risk in 
response to a fall (or rise) in business risk.  Business risk stems from the variability of the 
rate return on assets (ROA) and is independent of the firm’s capital structure.  The level 
of business risk is influenced by external factors such as uncertain market prices and 
yields, as well as by internal factors such as investment decisions and management skills. 2 
While business risk is the aggregate effect of all the uncertainty concerning the 
profitability of the firm before leverage, financial risk is related to the way a farm 
enterprise uses debt.  Financial risk arises from the fixed financial obligations and can be 
defined as the incremental increase in the variability of the rate of return on equity (ROE) 
due to financial leverage (Gabriel and Baker, 1980).   
    In further study of risk balancing, Collins (1985) indicated that risk-reducing farm 
policies would induce producers to increase their financial leverage to a level of desired 
financial risk.  Featherstone, Moss, Baker, and Preckel (1988) showed that risk-reducing 
farm policies may lead to increases in financial leverage, total risk, and the expected 
returns on farm equity.  Empirical evidence suggests that the increased financial risk 
associated with increased leverage adjustments to policy changes might increase the 
likelihood of farmers losing part of their equity or going bankrupt (Featherstone, Moss, 
Baker, and Preckel, 1988; Moss, Ford, and Boggess, 1989; Parcell, Featherstone, and 
Barton, 1998; Ramirez, Moss, and Boggess, 1997).  Thus, the concept of risk balancing 
raises a paradoxical question that farm policies designed to reduce business risk may lead 
to more risk for farmers and increase the probability of farm financial failure 
(Featherstone, Moss, Baker, and Preckel, 1988).  This is “the paradox of risk balancing”, 
which has been used as a theoretical argument about the futility of risk-reducing 
agricultural policies (Skees, 1999; Harwood, et al., 1999). 
    Results of the risk-balancing studies are essentially conducted under the 
assumption of one source of uncertainty: the rate of return on assets.  Collins (1985) 
presented a generalized Mean-Variance (M-V) analysis (known as the Collins-Barry 3 
model) to solve for the optimal financial leverage that approximates expected utility 
maximization of wealth.  This model has been used by many researchers to provide 
insights into agricultural finance and risk balancing (Collins and Karp, 1995).  However, 
Ramirez, Moss, and Boggess (1997) pointed out that the Collins-Barry model provides 
little insight into the dynamic nature of the consumption/investment tradeoff.  They 
argued that the consumption/investment decision in the dynamic model is central to the 
decision facing agricultural proprietors.  Therefore, they applied the Merton model of 
lifetime portfolio-selection (Merton, 1969) to formulate a stochastic dynamic 
programming model to derive the optimal leverage and consumption.  Capturing the 
same stochastic nature of the return on assets, the solution of the optimal leverage derived 
by Ramirez, Moss, and Boggess is essentially the same as the solution to the static 
Collins-Barry model (Collins and Karp, 1995).  
    These models typically assume that interest rates and borrowing costs are non-
stochastic or known with certainty.  Although many agricultural lenders may offer fixed 
interest rates over a short period of time, the assumption of non-stochastic interest rates is 
not consistent with financial theory.  The level of the interest rate is a key input in capital 
structure models, and the optimal capital structure may be very sensitive to changes in the 
level of the interest rate (Leland, 1994; Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001; Ju and Hui, 
2006).   Similarly, many lenders seek to shift interest rate risk to farmers through variable 
interest rates (Baker, 1984).  The farm financial crisis of 1980s has provided a powerful 
lesson about the interactions between agricultural markets and financial markets.  The 
period’s highly volatile interest rates played a key role in the resulting farm debt crisis.  4 
This paper argues that that a rational analysis of what is “optimal leverage” must 
recognize that there is uncertainty and interaction among the future rates of return on 
assets and interest rates.  The analytical techniques of risk balancing based upon the 
perfect foresight of interest rates may have led to biased or incorrect predictions 
regarding capital structure and the role of risk reducing agricultural policies.  
  In this paper, we use stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming (SOC/DP) 
to derive the optimal debt and consumption levels under two sources of uncertainty: the 
return on assets and the real interest rate.  The model used in the paper is based upon the 
work of Fleming and Stein (2004) who initially analyzed optimal debt, consumption, and 
endogenous growth in models of international finance and then extended their analysis to 
other areas of inquiry (Stein, 2004; 2005; 2006; Stein and Zheng 2007).  These studies 
generally consider economic units, which have productive capital and also incur debt.  
Thus, the approach could also be applied to the agricultural economy of a state, region, or 
sector within a country, as well as individual farm business enterprises.   
  The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between farm policies and 
farmers’ leverage decisions under multiple sources of uncertainty.  The analytical 
framework of SOC/DP is used to develop a better understanding of how leverage 
decisions respond to changes in the operating environment and farm policies.  The study 
has three interrelated research objectives: (1) investigate bias in optimal financial 
leverage when interest rate risk is ignored; (2) analyze how risk-reducing farm policies 
impact the leverage decision and, (3) determine how leverage adjustments made in 
response to policy changes impact farm equity returns and the variability of returns.   5 
  Ignoring interest rate risk may lead to a negative or positive bias in estimating 
optimal debt. The results of a numerical analysis will demonstrate situations where these 
biases exist.  Comparative statics analysis is used to analyze the effects of risk-reducing 
agricultural policies on farmer’s optimal leverage decision, the mean of ROE, and the 
variance of ROE.  The comparative statics effects derived from the SOC/DP model are 
compared to those produced by (A) the static M-V analysis under uncertainty of the 
return on assets, i.e. the Collins-Barry model (Collins, 1985; Featherstone, Moss, Baker, 
and Preckel, 1988), (B) the SOC/DP approach under uncertainty of the return on assets 
(Ramirez, Moss, and Boggess, 1997), and (C) the static M-V analysis under two sources 
of uncertainty: the return on assets and the interest rate on debt (Barry, Baker, and Sanint, 
1981; Parcell, Featherstone, and Barton, 1998).  These comparisons, along with a 
numerical example, identify conditions in which the concept of risk balancing is violated.   
    The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The second section describes 
the SOC/DP approach.  The third section shows the comparative statics analysis.  The 
fourth section summarizes the comparison of the comparative statics effects among the 
four different models.  The last section presents a numerical example and conclusion. 
 
The Stochastic Optimal Control/ Dynamic Programming Model  
  The SOC/DP approach is used to derive the optimal debt and consumption for the 
farm sector.  Farmers borrow to finance investment as well as consumption and face two 
sources of uncertainty, the return on agricultural investment and the variable interest rate 
on debt.  Under such uncertainty, the productivity of investment and the real interest rate 6 
are stochastic and unpredictable.  Decision makers cannot predict the future state of the 
economic system, because there are many possible paths that the system may take given 
the initial conditions and their past decisions.  When the future is unpredictable, the 
dynamic programming (DP) method is generally used to derive the optimal decisions for 
inter-temporal optimization problems.  
    Closely following the model developed by Fleming and Stein (2004), we present 
the DP solution for inter-temporal optimization decision model under uncertainty over an 
infinite horizon.  The stochastic control problem associated with the SOC/DP model is 
formulated by specifying the control and state variables, stochastic processes, the 
constraints, the dynamics of the state process, and the optimization criteria.  Then, the 
economic implications and interpretations are discussed and related to the standard 
Mean-Variance model.   
  Assume  that  farmers  maximize the expectation (E) of the discounted value (δ > 0) 
of the utility  ) (• U  of consumption  ) (t C  generated over an infinite horizon, equation (1).  
The maximization is expressed as the value function V(X) in equation (1), where X is the 
initial equity. 
(1)   { } ∫
∞ − =
0 )) ( ( max ) ( dt e t C U E X V
t δ  
Consumption,  ) (t C,   is required to be positive and is defined over a period of length dt in 
equation (2) as net income less interest payments on the external debt less investment 
plus the change in debt.  
(2)   , 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( > + − − = t dL dt t I dt t L t r dt t Y dt t C   7 
where ) (t Y is net income, ) (t r is the real interest rate, ) (t L is debt, and  ) (t I is investment.  
Uncertainty is introduced to the model through the interest rate and the return on assets.   
The real interest rate over the short period r(t)dt in equation (3) is the sum of a 
deterministic term, the mean rdt, plus the Browonian motion term  1 1dw σ , with a zero 
mean and the variance  dt
2
1 σ  over the period.  
(3)   , ) ( 1 1dw rdt dt t r σ + =   
where  1 dw ) 1 , 0 ( ~ , 1 1 N dt ε ε = . 
The stochastic component of the real interest rate may arise from variations in monetary 
policy, the business cycle, etc., and thus 
2
1 σ  is referred to interest rate risk, one of the 
major components of financial risk.  
    The production function in equation (4) states that net income  ) (t Y  is 
proportional to assets ) (t K .  The ratio of net income to assets  ) ( / ) ( t K t Y  is the rate of 
return on assets ) (t b , described by stochastic process in equation (5). 
(4)   ) ( ) ( ) ( t K t b t Y =     
(5)   2 2 ) ( dw bdt t b σ + =  
 where  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ , 2 2 2 N iid dt dw ε ε = .   
The rate of return on assets ) (t b  is the sum of a deterministic term bdt plus a stochastic 
term σ2dw2.  The deterministic term is the mean rate of return on assets b, with no time 
index, and the stochastic term is the Brownian motion σ2dw2, with a zero mean and a  
variance dt
2
2 σ .  The stochastic component of the rate of return on assets may result from 8 
variations in the prices of outputs and inputs as well as in yield and/or quality caused by 
weather, disease, pests, management, etc.  The variance of the return on assets 
2
2 σ   is 
commonly referred to “business risk”.  
    The critical feature of this model is that the stochastic processes of Brownian 
motion with drift are assumed to capture the uncertainty concerning the return on assets 
and interest payments.  The formulation allows for correlation between the two stochastic 
terms dw1, dw2 in equations (4) and (5).  The general case is considered in equation (6), 
where the two shocks are not necessarily independent.  The correlation coefficient ρ 
could be positive, zero or negative, depending upon the economic situation. 
(6)   [] [ ] , 1 1 , 2 1 2 1 − ≥ ≥ = = ρ ρ ε ε dt E w w E   
    The state variable of this model is the level of equity  ) (t X  defined as assets, ) (t K , 
less debt,  ) (t L , in equation (7).  Thus, the change in equity  ) (t dX is given in equation (8).  
Also, the change in assets  ) (t dK  in equation (9) is defined as the investment over the 
period dt t I ) ( . 
(7)   ) ( ) ( ) ( t L t K t X − =   
(8)   ) ( ) ( ) ( t dL t dK t dX − =   
(9)   dt t I t dK ) ( ) ( =   
The change of the state variable equity  ) (t X can also be expressed as equation (10).  
Substitute  ) (t dK  in equation (9) and  ) (t dL  in equation (2) into equation (8), and then 
apply equations (3)-(5) to obtain equation (10).  
(10)  [] [ ] 1 1 2 2 ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( dw t L dw t L t X dt t C t L r b t bX t dX σ σ − + + − − + =   9 
The dynamics of the state variable  ) (t X  in (10) has two components.  The first set of 
terms in square bracket is deterministic, and the second set of terms in square bracket is 
stochastic.  The state dynamics cannot be directly controlled but is conditional upon the 
level of the control variables and the realizations of the return on assets and interest rate.  
 
The Dynamic Programming Solution  
    The objective is to maximize the expected present value of utility equation (1) 
subject to the dynamic equation (10) and the constraints ) 0 ) ( , 0 ) ( ( > > t X t C .  The 
utility function is assumed to exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), equation 
(11) as γ <1 and 0 ≠ γ , or equation (12) as 0 = γ  and the risk aversion coefficient  ) 1 ( γ −   
is assumed to be positive.  
(11) 0 , 1 ), ( ) / 1 ( ) ( ≠ < = γ γ γ
γ t C t U   
(12)  0 )), ( ln( ) ( = = γ t C t U  
Based on the assumption of HARA utility, one can use the ratios of consumption/equity 
) ( / ) ( ) ( t X t C t c =  and debt/equity  ) ( / ) ( ) ( t X t L t f =  as the control variables (Fleming and 
Stein, 2004).  Thus, the dynamics of state variable in equation (10) can be written as 
equation (13) in terms of the control ratios  ) (t f and ) (t c . 
(13)  [] [ ] 1 1 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( dw t fX dw t X f dt t X f r b c b t dX σ σ − + + − + − =  
  The  control  variables  ) (t f  and  ) (t c are chosen based upon information known up 
to time t.  The optimal controls  ) , ( c f  are derived from the dynamic programming 
techniques in the same way as for the continuous time Merton portfolio optimization 10 
problem (Merton, 1969).  The Merton problem corresponds to the special case where the 
real interest rate is constant, i.e.  0 1 = σ (equation 3).  The derivation of the DP solution is 
presented in Stein (2006, Appendix B in Chapter 3) for details.  Our analysis begins with 
Stein’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) stochastic DP equation (14), which is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for optimality in the given dynamic system. 
(14)  ( ) [ ]
] [ ) ( / ) / 1 (








c b A c Max




+ + + − − − − =
γ γ
σ σ σ ρ σ γ γ δ
 
where  0 > A  is the constant to be determined from the solution.  The HJB equation (14) 
has two components: a maximum with respect to debt/equity, f,  and a maximum with 
respect to consumption/ equity, c.  The optimal debt ratio 
* f  in (15) and consumption 
ratio 
* c  in (16) are derived from the maximization of equation (14) with respect to fand 
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2 > − + = σ ρσ σ σ σ  is total variance.  
(16)  [ ] ) 1 /( ) (
* * γ γ δ γ − Λ + − = b c  







* 2 * * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 )( 2 / 1 ( ) ( σ σ σ ρ σ γ γ f f f f f r b + + + − − − − = Λ . 
 
Economic Implication and Interpretation 
The optimal level of the debt/equity ratio, 
* f , is positively related to the expected net 
return on assets  ) ( r b −   and negatively related to the risk coefficient  ) 1 ( γ − and total 11 
risk
2 σ .  Total risk (
2 σ ) is the variance of the net return on assets, i.e.  [] ) ( ) ( t r t b Var −  




1 σ ρσ σ σ − + .    The optimal debt level is positive if the expected rate of return 
on assets (b ) exceeds the expected real interest rate (r ) by an amount that depends on 
the variances of the return on assets and real interest rate and their correlation.  The 
optimal debt ratio 
* f  in (15) is independent of the consumption/equity ratio 
* c  in (16), 
but consumption depends upon the optimal debt ratio
* f .  The solution is also dependent 
upon the subjective parameters of risk aversion  ) 1 ( γ − and the discount rateδ .  The level 
of risk aversion is dependent upon the individual’s risk preference.  Notice that the 
discount rate does not enter into the maximization with respect to the optimal debt 
ratio
* f , thus the optimal debt level is not impacted by time preferences.  However, the 
optimal consumption ratio
* c is impacted by the discount rate.  
    The present SOC/DP results are generalizations of the Merton model, and also 
have a clear relationship to the Tobin-Markowitz Mean-Variance (M-V) analysis.  M-V 
analysis has been widely used in the agricultural finance literature (Collins and Barry, 
1986; Mapp, Hardin, Walker, and Persaud, 1979; Feldstein, 1980; Musser and Stamoulis, 
1981; Yassour, 1982; Kahl, 1983; Collender and Zilberman, 1985).  Fleming and Stein 
(2004) explain, and show graphically, how the inter-temporal dynamic programming 
equations can be given an interpretation in the static two-period M-V analysis.  It turns 
out that the SOC/DP solution to the optimal debt ratio can be viewed as selecting the 
debt/equity ratio that maximizes the M-V expected utility.   Therefore, we can apply the 
present SOC/DP solution to produce the optimal solution for the other three models, i.e. 12 
the M-V model with one type of uncertainty, the SOC/DP model with one type of 
uncertainty, and the M-V model with two types of uncertainty.  For example, setting 
2
1 σ = 0, ρ = 0, and replacing the mean interest rate, r  , with the spot interest rate, i ,  in 
equation (15) yields the optimal debt/equity ratio 
^ f  in (17) for both the SOC/DP and 
M-V models with uncertainty concerning only the return on assets.  
(17)     









   
The solution in (17) is mathematically equivalent to Collins’ equation (11) (1985, p. 629) 
and equation (10) of Ramirez, Moss, and Boggess (1997).  In this manner, one can find 
that the optimal solution obtained from adjusting the parameters in the present SOC/DP 
model is exactly the same as the optimal solution solved for the other three models by the 
previous literature.   
 
Comparative Statics 
    Comparative statics analysis of the SOC/DP model with two types of uncertainty 
is used to analyze how risk-reducing agricultural policies impact optimal leverage
1, the 
expected return on equity, and the variance of expected return.  The following results can 
also be applied to analyze the comparative statics effects for the other three models 
associated with the risk-balancing hypothesis and “the paradox of risk-balancing”. The 
comparative statics effects of the other three models derived from adjusting the 
                                                 
1 Financial leverage in the present study is defined as the debt-to-equity ratio.  The solution to optimal 
financial leverage in the models used to study risk balancing is most frequently defined as the debt-to-
asset ratio (Collins, 1985; Featherstone, Moss, Baker, and Preckel, 1988; Ramirez, Moss, and Boggess, 
1997).  The results presented for all models are reported in terms of the debt to equity ratio. 13 
parameters in the present SOC/DP model are consistent with those derived by the 
previous literature.   
 
Effect of Shift in Business Risk on Leverage Choice 
    To review the risk-balancing hypothesis derived form the M-V model with one 
source of uncertainty, we differentiate the optimal debt 
^ f   in (17) with respect to 
business risk (
2






























The result in (18) is equivalent to Collins finding, and assuming that the mean return on 
assets ( b ) is greater than the spot interest rate ( i ), clearly illustrates a negative 
relationship between business risk and financial leverage
2.  Other things equal, farm 
policies designed to reduce business risk will lead to increased borrowing and financial 
risk.  
  When two sources of risk are concerned, differentiating the optimal debt ratio 
* f  
in equation (15) with respect to 
2





































                                                 
2 Note that set 
2
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B .  In this situation the sign of the derivative is not clear.  
Assume the net return on assets  ) ( r b − >0 and 
* f >0.  Then the positive optimal debt 
ratio 
* f  in (15) implies  0 > B  in (19). This leaves four possible cases to consider. 
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  Case 2: If 0 > ρ  and 1 2 ρσ σ > , implying  0 1
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  Case 3: If  0 > ρ and 2 1 2 2 σ ρσ σ > > , implying  0 1
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  Case 4: If 0 > ρ  and 2 1 2σ ρσ > , implying 0 1
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Cases 3 and 4 both provide instances in which risk balancing may not describe how 
farmers adjust financial leverage in response to changes in business risk.  Case 4 is the 
only situation that unambiguously violates risk balancing.  Here, business risk and 15 
interest rate risk are positively correlated and interest rate risk is very large relative to 
business risk.  In fact, interest rate risk would have to be at least twice as large as 
business risk for this situation to occur.  Case 3 could also produce situations where 
producers would not respond to reductions in business risk by increasing financial risk.  
 
Effect of Shift in Business Risk on the Mean of Return on Equity 
    The mean rate of return on equity for the SOC/DP model concerning two sources 
of uncertainty  ) (
*
E R   can be defined as the expected growth of equity, i.e.  [] ) ( / ) ( t X t dX E .    
The mean of ROE in (20) is derived from the state variable dynamics in equation (13)  
(20) 
*










E  =  ) ( ) ( (
* r b c b − + − ( )
* f  
  Next, differentiating the expected mean of ROE in (20) with respect to
2



























r b   
The sign of equation (21) is obviously ambiguous, because 
2
2
* / σ ∂ ∂f  could be negative 
or positive and the sign of 
2
2
* / σ ∂ ∂c  is also unclear.  Thus, this qualitative result suggests 
that risk-reducing farm programs would may or may not increase the expected mean of 





Effect of Shift in Business Risk on the Variance of Return on Equity     
The variance of the return on equity 
* 2
E σ  in equation (22), defined as the variance of the 
growth of equity, i.e. [] ) ( / ) ( t X t dX Var , can also be derived form from the state variable 
dynamics in equation (13).  
(22) 
* 2
















1 1 1 2 f f f f + + + − σ σ ρσ σ  
Differentiating the expected variance of ROE in equation (22) with respect to 
2
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f f   
LetP  and Q be the terms of the first and the second square bracket in equation (23) 






∂ E  = Q P + .  This situation again produces four cases for 
consideration.   



















∂ E is unclear. 




















∂ E is unclear. 17 













,P , andQ are ambiguous and 







∂ E  is unclear. 













, the sign of P andQ ambiguous, 






∂ E  is unclear. 
The sign of equation (23) is ambiguous in all the cases, in contrast to the unequivocally 




















derived from the models with uncertainty 
concerning the return on assets only (Featherstone, Moss, Baker, and Preckel, 1988).
3   It 
implies that the paradox of risk balancing is not necessarily true for all possible 
conditions when both interest rate and returns are uncertain.  Thus, the qualitative result 
derived from equation (23) reveals that even though risk-reducing policies lead to 
increased optimal leverage, the induced financial risk does not necessary more than offset 
the decrease in business risk, bringing more total risk to farmers. For example, given the 



























∂ E  in 
equation (23) is greater than zero.  In other words, a situation can arise where farmers 
would increase optimal leverage in response to a reduction in business risk, but would 
                                                 
3 This partial derivative is equation (7) of Featherstone, Moss, Baker, and Preckel, (1988, p.574).  We also 
can produce it by plugging 
2
1 σ = 0, ρ  = 0, and  i r = into equation (23) 18 
arrive at a level of leverage that would leave them with a lower level of variability in 
return on equity than before the reduction in business risk occurred.  
 
Summary of Comparative Statics 
    Table 1 summarizes the sign of the comparative statics results to provide with a 
snapshot comparison of the four models.  For the M-V model with uncertainty 
concerning the return on assets only, the sign of three partial derivatives ( f ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂ , 
E R ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂ , and
2
E σ ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂  ) is negative.  These theoretical results state the risk balancing 
hypothesis and the paradox of risk balancing.  Thus, farm policies designed to reduce 
business risk increase the optimal debt ratio, the expected value of ROE, and the variance 
of ROE.  However, the comparative statics results derived from the other three models 
provide some situations that contradict the risk-balancing concept.  Three important 
points arise from the results in Table 1.  
    First, the effect of changes in business risk on optimal leverage adjustments 
becomes ambiguous when considering uncertainty associated with interest rates and the 
return on assets.  The impact of changes in business risk on optimal leverage ( f ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂ ) 
for both the M-V and SOC/DP models with two sources of uncertainty in Table 1 is 
either uncertain or definite, depending upon the magnitudes of the interest rate risk
2
1 σ , 
business risk
2
2 σ , and the correlation between the two ρ .  Given the condition  0 > ρ  
and 2 1 2σ ρσ > ,  the comparative statics result does not support the concept of risk 
balancing.  Thus, contrary to risk balancing, farm policies designed to reduce business 19 
risk may not always lead to higher levels of borrowing by farmers.  This would occur 
under occasions of relatively high interest rate risk and strong positive correlation 
between the interest rate risk and business risk. 
  Second, both the M-V and SOC/DP models with one source of uncertainty 
unequivocally predict that risk-reducing farm policies may lead to increased variance of 
the return on equity.  In other words, even as the government removes business risk, 
farmers add back enough financial leverage that their overall risk position is increased. In 
contrast, when both interest rates and return on assets are uncertain, the M-V and 
SOC/DP models show that the effect of changes in business risk on the variance of return 
on equity is ambiguous in all the cases (Table 1).  The ambiguous risk effect depends on 
the complicated relationship among the net return on assets ) ( r b − , risk aversion ( γ − 1) ,  
interest rate risk (
2
1 σ ), business risk (
2
2 σ ) and correlation between the risks ( ρ ).  
Furthermore, this implies that even though risk-reducing policies may lead to increased 
optimal leverage, the induced financial risk does not necessary more than offset the 
decrease in business risk, bringing more risk to farmers.  
    Finally, when explicitly incorporating the consumption decision in the SOC/DP 
models, consumption may be particularly important in determining the farms’ expected 
return on equity.  Thus, the effect of the expected return on equity to changes in business 
risk may partly depend on how farmers adjust consumption in response to changes in risk 
reducing agricultural policies.  The fifth column of Table 1 shows that the sign of 
( E R ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂  ) is unclear in the SOC/DP models that consider either one or two sources of 
uncertainty.  As the consumption/investment tradeoff is taken into account dynamically, 20 
the effect of changes in business risk on the mean of ROE cannot be determined without 
knowing subjective risk aversion and the magnitude of other parameters.  On the other 
hand, the sign of ( E R ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂ ) of the M-V models in the fourth column of Table 3 is either 
definite or uncertain, following the sign of ( f ∂ /
2
2 σ ∂ ) of the M-V models in the second 
column of Table 3.  
 
Conclusion: A Numerical Example 
  A numerical example is offered to demonstrate some results of the comparative 
statics analysis.  Specifically, this example shows that the effect of changes in business 
risk on the variance of ROE may be negative or positive, and thus risk-reducing farm 
policies may not necessarily lead to more risk for farmers.  In addition, this example 
examines the extent to which the estimates of the optimal debt level are biased when 
interest rate risk is ignored.  This empirical study utilizes aggregated data, although the 
conceptual framework of the present SOC/DP can be macro or micro in nature.   
    Farm sector income and balance sheet data for the period of 1985 to 2003 were 
obtained from the Economic Research Service (ERS) of USDA.  The data for value 
added ( ) (t Y ), value of farm assets ( ) (t K ), debt ( ) (t L ), interest expenses ( ) ( ) ( t L t r ), and 
equity ( ) (t X ) are all measured in constant dollars on a base 1996= 100.  The estimates of 
the rate of return on assets ( ) (t b ) and the real interest rate, ( ) (t r ), are calculated by 
) ( / ) ( t K t Y  and  ) ( / ) ( ) ( t L t L t r  for each period respectively.  Note that the real interest rate 
) (t r is denoted as the spot interest rate i when no interest rate risk is assumed.   21 
  Observe that over a long horizon, parameters b and r  in the model vary considerably 
depending upon the economic environment for agriculture (Table 2).  The variances and 
correlations also vary over time.  The analysis relies upon ten-year moving averages of 
) (t b and ) (t r  as the true means b  and r  for each period.  The parameter estimates of the 
standard deviation of  ) (t b ,  2 σ , the standard deviation of  ) (t r ,  1 σ , and the correlation of 
the return on assets and real interest rate, ρ , are computed over a rolling ten-year time 
period.  Table 2 presents the parameter estimates during the period of 1994 to 2003.  The 
subjective parameter of risk aversion was chosen as  ) 1 ( γ − =287, which minimizes the 
mean squared error between the estimated optimal debt/equity ratio 
* f and the actual 
aggregated farm debt/equity available on the ERS website. 
    These parameter estimates were used to calculate the optimal debt ratio and 
analyze the sign of the comparative statics effects for each period.  Table 2 also shows 
the optimal debt ratios derived from the models with two sources of uncertainty (
* f ) and 
the models with one source of uncertainty (
^ f ).  The numerical analysis demonstrates 
the substantial bias in the optimal debt estimation, caused by the perfect foresight of 
interest payments.  The models with one source of risk predict higher leverage ratios for 
years 1994-1997, and 2001.  In 1994, the optimal debt ratio estimates are 
* f =0.303 and 
^ f =3.815.  In this year, the amount of bias in the estimated debt level, calculated 
as
* * ^ / ) ( f f f − , was 1160% (Table 3).  The optimal debt ratios produced by the model 
with two sources of uncertainty can also be larger than those produced from the model 
with one source of uncertainty, such as the years 1998-2000, and 2002-3.  In general, the 22 
bias comes from the difference between the net return on assets  ) ( i b− of 
^ f  and 
) ( r b − of 
* f , and magnitudes and interactions of multiple sources of uncertainty.  
  When  the  correlation  coefficient  between interest rate and business risk is 
nonpositive ( 0 ≤ ρ ), the comparative statics analysis indicates that a decline in business 
risk warrants an increase in both the financial leverage 
* f and
^ f .  Hence, farm policies 
designed to reduce business risk will lead to an increase in financial risk, i.e. risk 
balancing.  However, the values of the correlation coefficient estimated in Table 2 are all 
positive.  In the macro economy, there is often a positive correlation between the return 
on investment and the interest rate.  An increase in the return on investment stimulates an 
economic growth, which leads to an increase in the interest rate.  A negative correlation 
between the return on capital and the interest rate may exist when there has been a change 
in monetary policy, or a financial crisis (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963).   
  Given the condition of 0 > ρ  and  1 2 ρσ σ > ,  and  γ − 1 =287, the empirical study 
through 1994-2003 does not have a situation in which the theoretical result of 
0 ) / (
2
2 > ∂ ∂ σ f  is found in practice (Table 3).  In addition, when there is a change in 
business risk, the empirical example shows that the effect on the mean of ROE moves in 
exactly the same direction as the effect on financial leverage (Table 3).  In these 
empirical results, risk-reducing farm policies may induce increases in financial leverage 
that increase the expected farm return.  
    In the years of 1994-1996, a positive relationship between changes in the variance 
of the return on equity and changes in business risk (
2
2
2 / σ σ ∂ ∂ E ) is observed in the model 23 
with two source of uncertainty (Table 3).  The realizations of two sources of uncertainty 
in years 1994-1996 show that a decrease in business risk will lead to an increase in 
financial leverage and the mean of ROE, but a decrease in the variance of ROE.  Thus, 
the effect of reducing business risk indirectly leads to an increase of financial risk 
through the leverage increase.  After the farm reaches its new leverage position, the 
decline in total risk due to risk-reducing farm policies more than offsets the induced 
financial risk due to increased financial leverage, thus finally resulting in a decrease in 
total risk.  These three cases contradict “the paradox of risk balancing”. Thus, by 
considering multiple sources of uncertainty in the analysis, the results suggest that risk-
reducing farm policies may help farmers use debt efficiently to reduce income volatility 
and increase the expected value of returns.  
  Overall, the comparative statics effects in Table 3 are consistent with the risk 
balancing hypothesis for all the years, and also consistent with the paradox of risk 
balancing for all other years except years 1994-1996.  Since risk-reducing farm policies 
may mostly induce income volatility due to increased leverage adjustments, researchers 
may be concerned that government interventions may increase the risk of farm failure.   
Nevertheless, the risk-return tradeoff can be central to farm capital structure and 
managerial decision-making.  When there is a leverage effect, an increase in return 
volatility may in turn raise the risk premium.  Government interventions may possibly aid 
farmers to achieve the mean-variance efficiency with an optimal mix of reward and risk, 
providing the highest prospective return for a given level of risk or the lowest risk for a 
given level of expected return. 24 
















































Two Sources of Uncertainty         
 








+ /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 
Case 2: If 0 > ρ & 1 2 ρσ σ >   ̶  ̶  ̶  + /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 
Case 3: If 0 > ρ &  2 1 2 2 σ ρσ σ > >  
 
 
+ /  ̶     + /  ̶     + /  ̶     + /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 








+ /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
 
+ /  ̶    
a.
 Effect of changes in business risk (
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2 σ ) on optimal leverage. 
b. Effect of changes in business risk (
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2 σ ) on mean of ROE ( E R ). 
c. Effect of changes in business risk (
2
2 σ ) on variance of ROE (
2
E σ ). 
 
 25 
Table 2: Parameter Estimates and the Optimal Debt/Equity Ratio, 1994-2003 
Year  b(t) i








) ^ ( f  
1994  0.113 0.085 0.113 0.099 0.0045 0.0111 0.195 0.303  3.815
1995  0.099 0.088 0.112 0.097 0.0062 0.0111 0.465 0.468  1.170
1996  0.116 0.088 0.113 0.095 0.0063 0.0106 0.472 0.600  1.135
1997  0.106 0.084 0.112 0.093 0.0067 0.0100 0.517 0.752  1.158
1998  0.099 0.082 0.111 0.090 0.0077 0.0089 0.638 1.093  0.695
1999  0.096 0.082 0.108 0.088 0.0081 0.0066 0.566 0.729  0.361
2000  0.096 0.083 0.106 0.085 0.0081 0.0038 0.467 0.374  0.225
2001  0.095 0.073 0.104 0.083 0.0087 0.0045 0.600 0.432  0.441
2002  0.079 0.068 0.101 0.081 0.0107 0.0063 0.775 0.111  0.000
2003  0.090 0.064 0.099 0.080 0.0108 0.0084 0.774 0.426  0.037
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∂ E  
1994  1160%  - - +  - - - 
1995  150%  - - +  - - - 
1996  89%  - - +  - - - 
1997  54%  - - - - - - 
1998  -36%  - - - - - - 
1999  -51%  - - - - - - 
2000  -40%  - - - - - - 
2001  2%  - - - - - - 
2002  -100%  - - - - - - 
2003  -91%  - - - - - - 26 
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